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Switzerland
Peter Zweifel
University of Zurich
Switzerland, a country with a population of approximately 7 million, is
of interest in comparative health policy for at least three reasons. First,
consumer preferences regarding health care are respected to a degree
found only in the United States—with similar consequences in terms of
health care expenditure. Second, Switzerland has a very decentralized
political system, especially when it comes to matters of health policy.
And third, the new Law on Health Insurance (LHI) of 1994, which sur-
vived the test of a popular referendum in 1996, has introduced managed
competition into the health care sector to an extent that seems to at least
parallel the other two well-known examples, Belgium and the Nether-
lands (Schokkaert 1996; van de Ven and van Vliet 1992).
Overview of Switzerland’s 
Health Care Sector
Political power is very decentralized in Switzerland. The confederation
is responsible for social health insurance, which has become mandatory
for the entire resident population under the new LHI. However, author-
ity for health policy continues to be vested with the twenty-six cantons
(member states) that mainly act as financiers of public hospitals. The
cantons also pay contributions toward operating costs and provide
investment grants to private hospitals that admit patients with social
health insurance. Some public health services are financed (and, in part,
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provided, especially in the case of nursing homes for the aged) by more
than 3,000 communes.
It has become customary to compare countries in terms of the share
of their GDP devoted to health care expenditure (HCE). Part A of Table 1
shows that Switzerland occupies an upper-middle position, comparable
to Germany’s. The contrast to Great Britain, with its National Health Ser-
vice, is commonly interpreted as evidence of inefficiency. Indeed, there
are indications to this effect:
Lower Real Than Nominal Share of HCE in GDP. As evidenced in part
B of Table 1, Switzerland’s real health share has recently been lower than
its nominal counterpart. This means that the health services deflator has
had a higher value than the GDP deflator. Thus, providers of health care
services may enjoy rents, that is, incomes in excess of what is necessary
to make them continue their activity rather than changing their profes-
sion or rehiring. 
High Average Price of Drugs. Part of the high relative price of HCE can
be traced to the fact that drugs command a higher price in Switzerland than
in most OECD countries as a result of the prohibition of parallel imports.
High Share of the Hospital Component of HCE. The particularly high
relative price of hospital services has a great impact on the HCE deflator,
since some 48.5 percent of total HCE is devoted to hospitals, a very high
figure in international comparisons (Federal Statistical Office 1997: 43).
Given the high degree of retrospective subsidization by most cantons,
the incentives for cost containment by hospitals are very weak.
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Table 1 Key Data for the Swiss Health Care Sector
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997
A. Nominal share of Health 
Care Expenditure in GDP (%)
Switzerland 4.9 6.6 6.9 7.7 8.3 9.6 10.1
Germany (West) 6.3 8.8 8.8 9.3 8.7 10.4 10.4 
Great Britain 4.5 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.0 6.9 6.7 
United States 7.3 8.2 9.1 10.6 12.6 13.6 13.6 
B. Real share of Health 
Care Expenditure in GDP (%)
Switzerland 6.4 7.4 7.1 7.6 8.3 9.2 9.4
Germany (West) 7.2 9.7 9.5 9.3 8.7 10.4 na
Great Britain 4.8 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.0 6.3 na
United States 9.3 10.7 11.2 11.9 12.6 12.3 12.1 
Source: OECD 1998.
Structural Features on the Supply Side. It has proved impossible for can-
tonal governments to close a hospital department, let alone an entire hos-
pital. This keeps hospital density at a high 113 patients per 10,000 inhabi-
tants, compared to 41 per 10,000 inhabitants in the United States as of 1995
(OECD 1997). Given that cantons finance investments to the tune of up to
80 percent, a community hosting a hospital may get five Swiss francs for
each franc it spends on the modernization or extension of its hospital.
On the other hand, the increasing HCE share in total income may reflect
preferences of consumers—an interpretation that should not be dismissed
lightly, for at least three reasons: First, research on the determinants of
HCE by industrial countries invariably ascribes a decisive role to income
(e.g., Gerdtham et al. 1992), regardless of the organization of their health
care sector. High elasticity estimates point to health care as a luxury good.
Second, industrial countries continue to exhibit an increasing rectangu-
larization of their survival curves. In Switzerland, for example, no less
than 92 percent of the cohort of women born around 1950 are estimated
to reach the age of seventy, up from 86 percent twenty-five years earlier
(Bopp and Gutzwiller 1998). This seems to reflect an ever-increasing
degree of control over health status, which certainly is in the interest of
risk-averse individuals. And third, unlike people in the United States and
other industrial countries, Swiss individuals can express their preferences
with regard to their future consumption of health care very directly because
social health insurance has always been individually contracted. Thus,
employers do not intervene as (imperfect) agents of consumers, aggregat-
ing preferences in ways that are difficult to reconstruct.
The Quest for Reform and the New Law 
on Health Insurance
The new LHI was promulgated in 1994 and passed a popular referendum
in 1996. It sought to relieve federal and cantonal government from some
of the burden of HCE, although the share of public HCE in total HCE
never exceeded 30 percent after 1980. This objective has been attained,
as the share of public HCE dropped from 29.8 percent in 1990 to 25.8
percent in 1996 (see part A of Table 2), which is very low compared to
other industrial countries (in the United States, for example, it is around
40 percent; see OECD 1997).
A major attempt at reform had failed in 1974, the reason implied by
part B of Table 2. It shows that the confederation had been withdrawing
systematically from the financing of public HCE, mainly by cutting back
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the per-enrollee subsidy it paid to the sick funds, which acts as social
health insurers. In the 1970s, the burden was shifted to the cantons, which
may have been a cause for their militating against the 1974 bill. Beginning
in the later 1970s, the cantons were able to make the communes (which
are not represented as such in federal parliament, contrary to the cantons)
responsible for a greater share of public HCE. To protect the interests of
the cantons, the new LHI requires sick funds to cover 50 percent of the
operating cost of hospital services included in the basic package.
Thus the motivation for the new LHI especially on the part of federal
politicians was to shelter their budgets from future demands coming from
health care. To win voters’ support of the bill, the declared aim of the
reform was to marry efficiency with equity. Two features of the new law
were designed to accomplish this purpose:
Means-Tested Subsidy of Health Insurance Premiums. Previously, a per-
enrollee subsidy was paid to the sick funds in return for their acting as reg-
ulated carriers of social health insurance. Now, cantons were mandated to
fix a benchmark ratio of premiums to taxable household income (typically
between 8 percent and 10 percent), beyond which households receive a
premium subsidy. The confederation was to provide matching grants.
Competing Sick Funds as Prudent Purchasers. The new law eliminated
the “any willing provider” clause with regard to physicians. This opened
the way to the creation of HMOs and PPOs, ending an era of uniform con-
tracts that had lasted eighty years. Now, competition can be counted on to
force providers to come up with products having a favorable benefit-cost
ratio, but not necessarily with minimum cost (in combination with low-
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Table 2 Size and Structure of Public Health Care Expenditure (HCE) 
in Switzerland
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
A. Share of private HCE (%) 66* 68* 71* 70.6 70.2 72.2 74.2
Share of public HCE (%) 34* 32* 29* 29.4 29.8 27.8 25.8
B. Structure of public HCE (%)
of the confederation 18.3 14.0 14.4 10.7 9.1 12.2 14.8
of the cantons 64.4 67.5 59.4 40.5 60.5 53.3 52.7
of the communes 17.3 18.5 26.2 28.8 30.4 34.5 32.5
Source: Pharma Information 1997.
*Author’s estimate, based on the assumption that within social insurance a constant 7 per-
cent of HCE (the average value after 1985) is controlled by (1) the public scheme for old-age
provision, (2) accident insurance, and (3) military insurance. The remainder is payments by
competing sick funds, which are allocated to private HCE.
ered quality), as politicians had hoped. Of course, voters were also disap-
pointed when premiums rose quickly after the implementation of the LHI,
though that was largely the consequence of a still-more-comprehensive
basic package of covered services mandated by parliament.
The data in Table 3 are not fully compatible with those of Table 2
because they eliminate double counting among the different levels of
government. Yet these data do suggest that the impact of the new LHI
has been to shift the financial burden to households in the guise of
increased payments to insurers (premiums). On the other hand, out-of-
pocket payments have decreased due to the extension of the basic pack-
age. It should be noted that the figures do not mean that one-fourth of the
health bill is borne by patients in the event of illness. An unknown (but
substantial) part of out-of-pocket payments is for private accommodation
in the hospital, which most often is reimbursed by supplementary health
insurance. Conversely, the total public share of HCE has decreased, from
roughly 28 percent to 25 percent. This does not imply increased regres-
sivity in financing, however, because the additional funding from the
confederation is now targeted to lower-income households in the guise of
premium subsidies.
With targeted premium subsidies, it would have been possible to let
social health insurers calculate their premiums according to true risk
while exposing them fully to competition. High risks would have had to
pay high premiums, but would also have received a substantial subsidy
whenever premiums exceeded the 8–10 percent benchmark share of
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Table 3 Final Sources of HCE Finance in Switzerland 
1985 1991 1995
Households (%) 62.2 61.4 65.1
Out-of pocket payments 30.8 29.0 25.9
Payments to insurers 31.5 32.4 39.3
Public contribution (%)
Confederation 7.1 6.9 8.2
Cantons 17.5 18.1 14.8
Hospitals, home care 15.1 15.7 13.3
Communes 2.8 3.2 2.2
Total public contribution (%) 27.4 28.2 25.2
Others (employers, workplace 10.4 13.6 11.9
accident insurance) (%)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Federal Statistical Office 1997: 39.
income. Instead, the new LHI stipulates that a given sick fund must charge
a uniform premium to all adults of a given region. The official justification
was increased price transparency and lowered switching costs for con-
sumers; however, politicians may also have feared unexpected surges in
subsidies caused by those individuals classified as high risks.
Of course, uniform premiums create strong incentives for risk selection,
which is prohibited by the LHI. As a countermeasure, a risk-adjustment
scheme was introduced in 1993. But the risk-adjustment formula contains
only age and sex as predictors of future HCE. Such a formula is known to
have very low predictive power (van de Ven and van Vliet 1992; Beck and
Zweifel 1998). One way to attract low risks in a given age and sex group
may be the creation of new forms of provision. In fact, Konstantin Beck
(1998) argues that the rapid expansion of HMOs and PPOs in Switzerland
(with a market share still below 10 percent at the time of writing) may
serve this purpose rather than the objective of improving the cost-benefit
ratio in the interest of consumers.
The Future of Managed Competition 
in Switzerland
The reform of Swiss social health insurance that was implemented in
1994 and accepted by the voters in 1996 reflected the wish of politicians
to reduce the burden of HCE on their budgets. This shift need not fall on
the poor, because low-income households receive a subsidy once the pre-
mium for social health insurance exceeds a limit in the order of 8–10
percent of taxable income. The reform would have permitted full price
and product competition, but the new LHI imposes uniform premiums
for adults of a given region, strengthening insurers’ incentives for “cream-
skimming,” which are only partially neutralized by a risk-adjustment
scheme. Overall, the reform could be judged weakly pro-competitive in
that it gives sick funds the freedom to develop new products and to select
physicians with a favorable cost-benefit ratio.
Thus the future of managed competition seems to hinge importantly
on improvements of the risk-adjustment mechanism. In view of the fact
that a major part of lifetime HCE occurs during the last year before
death, the mortality rate could be included in the formula (Beck and
Zweifel 1998). Alternatively, prior hospitalization may be used (Lamers
1997). But two additional problems must be solved for managed compe-
tition to work. First, cantons need to withdraw from hospital financing
that will permit hospital management to conclude preferential contracts
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with health insurers. Preferential contracts would provide hospitals with
market signals, encouraging specialization in areas of comparative advan-
tage. On the other hand, a hospital unable to contract with any competi-
tive insurer would have to close down. HMO and PPO patients would
profit from lower rates, and quite likely improved quality, due to increased
volumes of procedures of a given type.
The second condition for success is to stop ongoing attempts on the part
of both sick funds and cantonal medical associations to create a uniform
fee schedule. Such a schedule eliminates price competition in spite of the
abolition of the “any willing provider” clause by the new LHI. Admit-
tedly, individual schedules for each contract between a single insurer and
a group of health services providers may cause excessive administrative
costs; the proper alternative should not be to create a single uniform fee
schedule but a choice among several standardized schedules.
In spite of the clouded horizon, the idea of choice is now firmly rooted in
the thinking of all parties concerned. Consumers are increasingly learn-
ing to compare conventional medicine with the managed care alternatives
offered to them; social health insurers compete much more intensely for
enrollees; physicians are getting slowly accustomed to the concepts of eval-
uation and quality assurance; and hospitals are becoming interested in treat-
ment alternatives that are less costly in order to meet insurers’ demands. At
the very least, there is a willingness to try out new solutions that had not
been known for decades in Swiss health care.
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